In this article I examine how the network externalities of communications activities and trading opportunities interact to determine the structure of comparative advantage. 
Introduction
The rapidly growing connectivity of individuals and organizations achieved through improved communications networks (e.g., the Internet, mobile telephone networks, and satellite communications systems) has allowed a consequent increase in the flow of business transactions. These networks are often characterized by the existence of strong network externalities: the more people who use them, the more useful they are to any individual user. Accordingly, sophisticated and well-connected country-specific networks have become recognized as the 'competitive weapons' with which battles for comparative advantage are won. In his recent bestselling book, The World Is Flat, Thomas Friedman argues as follows:
... information technologies are important not only because they are big global businesses in and of themselves, but also because they are critical to advancing productivity and innovation.... The more you connect an educated population to the flat world platform in an easy and affordable way, the more things they can automate, and therefore the more time and energy they have to innovate.... (Friedman, 2006 , p. 350) 3 Friedman also highlights the importance of producers in knowledge-based, high-tech industries, such as the consulting, financial services, software and marketing industries.
The seminal contribution on the role of network externalities is by Katz and Shapiro (1985) , who analyzed oligopolistic competition between providers of network services.
1 However, as their model is based on a closed market for a consumption good, the role of network externalities as a determinant of trade patterns is downplayed in the analysis. Since such effects are often observed in the world economy, it seems important to explore the relationship between network externalities and trading opportunities in the open economy setting.
As its primary contribution, this study examines how the network externalities of communications activities and trading opportunities interact to determine the trade patterns between countries. I also emphasize an important concept related to network externalities -interconnectivity-which allows users of a network to communicate with users of other networks. 
The Model
Consider a world economy consisting of two countries, Home and Foreign.
There are two goods: a primary commodity which is produced only by labor and a knowledge-based, high-tech product which is produced with both In equilibrium, providers i and j will both have a positive number of subscribers only if
where (f i + p) − vy e i is the connection cost adjusted for network size. 
To simplify the analysis, I assume that the production cost for each provider is equal to zero. Thus, the i-th provider's profits are
Each provider chooses its optimal number of subscribers by differentiating eq. (4) with respect to x i .
Before turning to providers' behavior, let us consider the equilibrium supply level of the high-tech product. By Equations (1) and (3), a type-r worker can produce r + z + f + p − L units of product. Furthermore, only those workers for whom r is greater than L − z join the network, while the others choose to produce the primary good. Integrating all workers who do connect to the networks, we can obtain the total output of the high-tech product:
We can interpret this as the supply function of the high-tech product. This function is represented by OS in Figure 1 Each country thus has a supply function that exhibits increasing returns to the size of the networks.
There are two sources of these gains: (1) as more workers join the networks and the total number of subscribers increases, each infra-marginal worker can attain higher productivity through intensified network externalities; and (2) through these network externalities, each service provider chooses to set a lower connection fee, which further attracts more workers.
More noteworthy is that, in terms of income inequality between sectors, as the size of the networks becomes larger, income inequality between sectors increases.
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Depending on the interconnectivity between providers, several cases can emerge as the production equilibrium. The following subsections discuss two special cases: fully interconnected networks and unconnected networks.
The Case of Interconnected Networks
Let us assume that n providers are fully interconnected. 5 A user who connects to one network can communicate with users of other networks. Interconnectivity expands the size of each network to the total membership of all providers. This raises the productivity gains enjoyed by a worker who subscribes to only one provider's network because network externalities depend on the total size of the network (i.e., z = x 1 + ... + x n ). Equation (4) becomes
. 4 Note that productivity in the primary good remains constant.
5 As space is limited, I concentrate on the nature of the equilibrium and pay scant attention to the factors that determine interconnectivity. The case of endogenous formation of interconnected networks will be discussed in Section 4.
Maximizing this with respect to x i , we obtain
Imposing the requirement that in equilibrium workers' expectations are fulfilled (Fulfilled Expectation Equilibrium), z e = z = nx holds. Then we obtain the equilibrium number of subscriber for each provider:
By summing Equation (6) over all providers, we obtain the total network size as a function of the relative price of the high-tech product (1/p).
where superscript I denotes the fulfilled expectations equilibrium value when the networks are fully interconnected. The equilibrium is depicted in Figure   1 
The Case of Unconnected Networks
Next, let us consider the case in which n providers are not connected to each other. Subscribers on one network cannot communicate with those on the other networks. In this case, y i = x i holds. If there exists a symmetric equilibrium, x = z/n holds. Thus, instead of (6), we obtain,
with superscript U denoting the equilibrium value of the unconnected networks. This case is represented by the dotted curve in Figure 1 (a). Since network externalities are smaller than in the case of interconnection, the equilibrium total size of the network, z U , also becomes smaller than z I . With these figures we obtain the supply curves of the high-tech product ( Figure   2 ). The supply curve of the country with interconnected networks is located to the right of the country with unconnectd networks. Note that z I > z U (S > S * ) holds.
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Let us define the export supply functions of the high-tech product:
Autarky equilibrium requires that E = E * = 0. Thus, from (9) and (10) Home workers choose to subscribe to the networks. From their viewpoint, 7 Note that we assume away any income effect. 8 In what follows, * denotes variables for Foreign.
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producing the primary good becomes less attractive. 9 At the same time, as
(1/p * ) falls, producing the high-tech product becomes less attractive in Foreign. Thus, the scale of Home (interconnected) networks will expand while Foreign (unconnected) networks will contract. The differences in the network sizes will be reinforced by this entry-exit process. In Home, additional entry of new workers enhances exports of the high-tech product:
Through these mechanisms, the circular relationship between network expansion and trade creation continues. That is, there will be a cumulative process in which the opportunity for trade (i.e., an increase in price) brings about the opportunity for larger networks, and the increased sizes of the networks promote (through intensified network externalities) exports. This process will continue until the price differential between countries disappears.
From (9) and (10), the trading equilibrium price (1/p T ) is determined by the following condition:
Proposition 1: A comparative advantage in the high-tech product is held by a country with interconnected networks. If the two countries commence free trade from autarky, the country with interconnected networks incompletely
9 Note that r + vz − f = p holds for the marginal worker.
specializes in the high-tech product and the country with unconnected networks
incompletely specializes in the primary good.
Note the impact of trade on income inequality between sectors within each country. Since productivity in the primary-good sector remains constant (i.e., one unit of labor produces one unit of the primary good), we only have to concentrate on the productivity in the high-tech product sector.
As I have shown in the previous section, the size of the networks positively affects productivity. 
Discussion
In this section I describe two directions in which the model could be ex- Secondly, let us consider the endogenous formation of interconnected networks.
10 In analyzing this I will look at each provider's change in profits,
where π I (π U ) represents each provider's profits in the case of interconnected (unconnected) networks. Also, I assume that there is a fixed cost for interconnection, f , which each provider must pay before interconnection. Substituting equilibrium output levels into the profit function (4), we can calculate each provider's equilibrium profits as π
Thus, the change in profits becomes:
Note that both the population size (L) and the magnitude of network exter- 
Concluding Remarks
This study highlights the role of network externalities as a driving force behind trade in knowledge-based, high-tech products. It should be emphasized that differences in connectivity among country-specific communications networks determine the comparative advantages of countries. When two countries are endowed with equal amounts of labor, the country with connected networks can attain higher productivity with its superior informationhandling capabilities. This outcome differs from results obtained from trade models with increasing returns and imperfect competition. In those models, a country with either a larger factor endowment or a larger domestic market acquires a comparative advantage in the good that is produced under increasing returns to scale technology. 12 The present model suggests, however, that even a smaller country can acquire a comparative advantage in a high-tech product via the utilization of interconnected networks. What really matters is interconnectivity rather than country size. More noteworthy is that there is a circular process between network expansion and trade creation which further affects income inequality within each country.
Although these results are derived under the assumption that communica- tions networks are purely country-specific, it appears that something similar to this will occur in more general settings. The present analysis must be regarded as very tentative. Hopefully, it provides a useful paradigm for the consideration of how communications infrastructure works as a driving force for international trade. 
